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INTRODUCTION
In their article in this issue, Professors Peter Menell and Ryan Vacca
describe a federal court docket that is overloaded and unable to process cases
efficiently.1 As they depict it, justice in the federal courts is either delayed or
denied,2 disparity in legal outcomes among circuits is increasing, and the
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assistance in tracking down relevant data.
1. Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and Confronting the Federal Judiciary Capacity
“Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 795 (2020) (providing
data about the federal courts that show “expanding caseloads and growing complexity and fragmentation
of federal law”).
2. Id. at 872 (“The bottleneck at the top of the judiciary pyramid has become more constricting.
The lack of clarity of the law, in conjunction with the high stakes of litigation and relatively low cost of
appeal, fuels spiraling litigation and undermines economic, social, and political decision-making and
institutions.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Supreme Court is falling farther and farther behind in resolving circuit splits.3
While these problems have been around for a while,4 Menell and Vacca argue
they are getting worse and will only continue to worsen if radical action is not
taken.5 Their article provides enough of a factual record to raise the concern that,
because of their workload, the federal courts are not resolving cases as capably
as they could.
While Menell and Vacca focus on civil litigation in the federal system, this
Article looks instead at criminal cases. It first considers whether the problems
Menell and Vacca describe on the civil side afflict criminal litigation to the same
extent. On the assumption that the problems in the criminal docket are similarly
acute, it then considers whether anything can be done about them.
Part I of this Article assesses the efficiency, uniformity, and quality of
criminal justice in the federal system. It starts by noting that, while the federal
criminal docket is not as overloaded as the civil docket on which Menell and
Vacca focus, the number of criminal and prisoner cases commenced in federal
court has far outpaced increases in judgeships.6 Perhaps as a result, resolution of
these cases at the district court level has slowed appreciably over the past several
decades, and while the rate at which criminal cases are terminated at the appellate
level has not changed substantially, that stability appears to have come at a
serious cost. Significant circumstantial evidence suggests that the federal
appellate courts are not resolving criminal matters as carefully as they once did,
in large part because over three-quarters of federal court cases are now handled
through decisional shortcuts such as unpublished opinions and surrogate
decision-makers, practices that are particularly prevalent in litigation affecting
criminal defendants and prisoners.7 Making matters worse, the Supreme Court
has become increasingly less able, or less willing, to resolve circuit court
conflicts over criminal law issues.8
In short, the trend lines in criminal litigation, while not as dramatic as they
are on the civil side, are not moving in the right direction. More importantly, the
same courts that are handling the increased criminal caseload also have to deal

3. Id. at 873 (“[T]here is reason to believe that nearly half of the certiorari-worthy petitions are
being denied review today.”).
4. See, e.g., id. at 815–19 (recounting the findings of the Hruska Commission, which published
one report in 1973 and another in 1975 detailing a dramatic increase in caseloads per district court judge,
the shortcuts taken by appellate courts in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the need for resolution of intercircuit conflicts).
5. Id. at 795, 879–80 (proposing a “2030 Commission” charged with recommending reforms
that would not go into effect until 2030, in an effort to avoid recommendations tainted by partisan
politics).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 17–27.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 48–56.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 33–45.
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with a civil caseload that, in proportion to the number of authorized judgeships,
is astronomically greater than it was in the 1970s.9
One obvious response to this situation is the authorization of more judges.
However, that solution is probably a pipe dream in our current politically charged
climate, since neither party wants to give the other party a means of dominating
the third branch of government.10 On the assumption that the current impasse on
expanding the judiciary is likely to continue,11 Part II considers a version of a
proposal put forward over twenty years ago: creation of a separate federal court
system for criminal cases.12 Under this proposal, the criminal-civil divide would
exist at all three levels (trial, intermediate appellate, and ultimate appellate).
Litigants could petition the ultimate criminal court for certiorari review, and
from that court seek relief at the U.S. Supreme Court. To minimize potential
problems posed by an entrenched specialized judiciary, such as capture or
judicial ennui, judges could rotate between civil and criminal court at both the
trial and intermediate appellate levels.
Such a court system would significantly enhance the capacity of the federal
courts to produce quality opinions in the criminal arena, given the greater
expertise of a specialized judiciary and the increase in judicial resources that
would be devoted to resolving criminal cases. Furthermore, because there would
be a superior appellate court devoted to ensuring uniform nationwide rules, such
a system could more easily resolve doctrinal conflict on criminal justice issues
than the current system, which relies on a Supreme Court that is failing to address
most of the differences among the circuits. Perhaps the most important potential
benefit of this division of the civil and criminal systems, however, is that the civil
system would function more efficiently once criminal cases, which have docket
priority at the trial court level, are diverted.13
Continuing the reformist agenda, Part III considers a second significant
institutional change that could supplement the creation of a separate federal
criminal court system: a return to a more indeterminate sentencing regime that
would shift much of the heavy lifting regarding criminal dispositions from judges
to parole boards. In earlier work, I put forward this proposal for reasons unrelated
to trimming judicial assignments, reasons principally having to do with reducing

9. See Menell & Vacca, supra note 1, at 845 (“The annual number of cases terminated has
increased 465 percent from 62,955 in 1970 to 355,706 in 2017. Civil terminations have driven much of
this increase . . . .”).
10. See id. at 794 (“Judiciary reform has become a legislative third rail, too dangerous for
politicians . . . to discuss.”).
11. See id. at 796 (“Despite substantial hand-wringing and studies recommending
reform, . . . Congress last increased the number of judicial slots in the early 1990s.”); see also infra note
127.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 67–75 (explaining Victor Williams’s 1996 proposal that
the federal court system be separated into civil and criminal divisions).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 84–85 (contextualizing the precedence that criminal
cases take over civil matters in federal district court).
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incarceration rates.14 Here, the proposal is repurposed as a means of lessening
the appellate workload and ensuring that trial judges in a specialized criminal
court are not debilitated by the psychologically demanding analysis that
currently accompanies sentencing.15
One definitional point before proceeding: by “criminal” cases, this Article
means not only traditional criminal cases trying defendants for crimes but also
habeas cases seeking to overturn convictions or sentences and prisoner rights
cases alleging unconstitutional prison conditions or treatment. Even though these
last two categories of cases are usually considered “civil” in nature,16 they are
closely associated with criminal justice issues and are included in that category
in the following discussion.
I.
EVALUATING FEDERAL JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN CRIMINAL CASES
Has the ability of the federal courts to handle criminal cases in a competent
manner declined in the past several decades? That question probably cannot be
answered directly. But transposing to the criminal arena the methodology that
Menell and Vacca use in their survey of the entire federal system, one can get
some sense of the answer to this question by looking at changes in the time
federal courts take to process cases (efficiency), their ability to resolve conflicts
among courts (consistency), and the manner in which they make decisions
(quality). That effort is undertaken here, after documenting the main reason the
changes are likely to have occurred—a significant increase in caseloads in the
federal courts without a corresponding increase in federal judgeships.
A. The Federal Criminal Docket
Menell and Vacca’s data indicate that the average number of traditional
criminal cases commenced in federal criminal court went from around fifty
thousand during the decade from 1970 to 1980 to about eighty-nine thousand
during the decade from 2007 to 2017, despite a fairly significant decrease in
criminal case filings in the last four years of the latter decade.17 This represents
an increase of almost 80 percent over a forty-five year period. Habeas and
prisoner rights claims increased at an even faster pace, so when they are added

14. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Risk-Based Sentencing, in PREDICTIVE
SENTENCING: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 107 (Jan W. De Keijser et al., eds., 2019).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 120–126.
16. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 139 (3d ed. 2000) (“Most of today’s
post-conviction proceedings are viewed as independent civil actions, but some are considered part of the
original criminal case, similar to a post-appeal motion for a new trial.”).
17. See Menell & Vacca, supra note 1, at 844 fig.2.
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into the analysis, the overall change in the number of cases connected to criminal
law is very significant, at over 230 percent.18
This increase in criminal-related dockets should not be surprising. From
1970 to 2016, the population grew steadily (by about 58 percent19), and
incarceration rates skyrocketed.20 Additionally, the explosion in the number of
federal criminal statutes,21 the Warren Court’s expansion of procedural rights,22
and the passage of the federal sentencing guidelines23 created entirely new areas
of litigation.
Unfortunately, Congress has not seen fit to create a proportionate number
of new federal judgeships. Over the past fifty years, the number of authorized
full-time judgeships at the court of appeals increased from 97 to 179, an 85
percent change, and the number of authorized full-time judges at the district court
level went from 398 to 667, only a 67 percent increase.24 Obviously, both

18. Some approximations are necessary to achieve this figure. There were 77,128 traditional
criminal case filings in 2017, see Menell & Vacca, supra note 1, at 844 fig.2, and 73,725 habeas and
prisoner rights action filings in that year, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
COURTS:
TABLE
C-2
(2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c2_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/428VG64X], for a total of 150,853 criminal filings in 2016. There were 49,416 traditional criminal case filings
in 1970, Menell & Vacca, supra note 1, at 844 fig.2, and 15,997 habeas and prisoner rights action filings
in that year, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE
PRISONER PETITIONS: HABEAS CORPUS 2 tbl.1 (1984), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hcfrspp.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XP9-A9YW], for a total of 65,413 criminal filings in that year. 150,853 is
roughly 231 percent of 65,413.
19. See US Population by Year, MULTPL.COM, https://www.multpl.com/united-statespopulation/table/by-year [https://perma.cc/4V6C-VAGZ].
20. A conservative estimate is that the United States’ incarceration rate rose from approximately
one hundred people per hundred thousand in the late 1960s to somewhere between five and six hundred
people per hundred thousand today. See Franklin E. Zimring, Is There a Remedy for the Irrelevance of
Academic Criminal Law?, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5, 7 fig.1 (2014).
21. JAMES A. STRAZZELLA, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 5
(1998),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/Federalization_of_Crimina
l_Law.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4U5Y-NPF4] (“Congressional activity making essentially
local conduct a federal crime has accelerated greatly . . . .”).
22. See, e.g., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE
5
(1990),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/RepFCSC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4LRR-VVYP] (referring to “the creation of many new federal rights” as one reason
for the uptick in federal cases).
23. See Nancy J. King & Michael O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy,
55 DUKE L.J. 209, 227–28 (2005) (finding, based on a survey of 971 cases, that “the rate of appeals per
conviction peaked in 1994 at about double the rate prior to 1987 (when the Sentencing Reform Act
became effective)” but also noting that the rate of appeals “has consistently declined since then,” a
development that “coincides with the increased enforcement of waivers by the courts of appeals”).
24. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS: ADDITIONAL
AUTHORIZED
JUDGESHIPS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/appealsauth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3P9S-48QQ] (tracking the number of authorized federal court of appeals judgeships
from year to year, excluding temporary judgeships); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS: ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS [hereinafter U.S. DISTRICT COURTS:
ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/districtauth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HC7U-PDWH] (same but for federal district court judgeships).
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percentages are well below the increase in the criminal caseload as defined in
this Article. Furthermore, even if equilibrium between judgeships and criminal
cases had been maintained,25 the added judges would have had to have dealt with
a significant increase in civil cases as well, which typically outnumber criminal
cases by a substantial margin.26 As Menell and Vacca document, the average
number of cases filed per judge has increased by 47 percent since 1971, and the
average number of cases terminated per judge has increased by 90 percent, with
the bulk of the surge coming on the civil side.27
The question then becomes whether this extra workload has affected the
efficiency, consistency, or quality of federal judicial decisions in criminal cases.
The following analysis strongly suggests that, while the pace at which criminal
cases are resolved has not changed substantially, unresolved inter-circuit
conflicts on criminal issues have increased significantly, and the quality of
criminal jurisprudence has noticeably declined.
B. Efficiency
With respect to efficiency, Menell and Vacca report that processing time at
the trial level increased by roughly 79 percent between 1972 and 2017.28 But
they do not separate out criminal cases in their analysis. One might conjecture
that processing time at the trial level has not increased substantially on the
criminal side, given the fact that criminal trial judges must abide by speedy trial
rules, the parameters of which have remained fairly constant since 1974.29 But
in fact, the median time from initiation of a traditional criminal case to its
termination at the district court level has skyrocketed by more than 200 percent
in the past forty-five years, from around three months to over seven months.30

25. Given an increase of fifty-eight district court judgeships in 1970, see U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS: ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS, supra note 24, had 1969 been used as the base date,
the increase in judges by 2017 would have been 98 percent.
26. For instance, in 2016, a typical year, there were 215,742 “pure” civil filings (i.e., excluding
prisoner and habeas petitions) and 152,747 combined criminal filings and prisoner and habeas petitions,
see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: TABLE
C-2
(2016),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_c2_1231.2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9N3Z-TJ5Y]; ADMIN. OFFICE, U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES
COURTS:
TABLE
D
(2016),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_d_1231.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZB9L8HU], which means that the number of criminal filings as defined in this article amounted to only
about two-thirds the number of civil filings, and constituted about 40 percent of the total number of cases
filed (368,489).
27. Menell & Vacca, supra note 1, at 848.
28. Id. at 851.
29. The federal Speedy Trial Act, which requires that federal district courts establish a plan for
commencing criminal trials within one hundred days of arrest or service of summons, went into effect
in 1974. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b), (c)(1).
30. E-mail from Ryan Vacca to author (Apr. 6, 2020) (on file with author) (including table
showing that median processing time for criminal cases was 92 days for the five years from 1972 to
1976 and 219 days for the five years from 2013 to 2017).
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The criminal appellate process is not constrained by speedy-trial rules.
Nonetheless, here a much different picture emerges. Although data going back
to the 1970s are not available, the information we have for the past two decades
indicates that the median time it takes to resolve an appellate case—measured
from filing the notice of appeal to final disposition—has not changed
significantly for either criminal or civil appeals,31 a tendency that also appears
to be true of habeas cases when viewed in isolation, except for those involving
capital offenses.32
That is not the end of the story, however. The available evidence strongly
suggests that the relative stability in criminal case processing times at the
appellate level is primarily due to decision-making shortcuts and other
adjustments adopted by the federal courts. Those developments are discussed
below, after a look at how increasing caseloads have affected doctrinal
consistency.
C. Consistency
A second concern about the federal court system that Menell and Vacca
pinpoint is that, due to the combined effect of the increase in caseloads, the rise
in decisions by subgroupings of the various circuits, and the shrinkage of the
Supreme Court docket,33 uniformity in legal doctrine has suffered. A number of
earlier studies suggested that, over the last quarter century, inter-circuit conflicts
have become increasingly less likely to be resolved.34 Similarly, Menell and
Vacca’s up-to-date analysis of the civil and criminal dockets leads them to
conclude that “there is reason to believe that nearly half of the certiorari-worthy
petitions are being denied review today” by the Supreme Court.35 They also find

31. According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the median period from notice
of appeal to disposition in both criminal cases and civil (including habeas and prisoner) cases in 1997
was 11.4 months,
12.2 months in 2007, and 8.9 months in 2017. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE B-4 (1997),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/b04sep97.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4KWV-YTCT]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED
STATES
COURTS,
TABLE
B-4
(2007),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/B04Sep07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/994F-EYFZ]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED
STATES
COURTS,
TABLE
B-4
(2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b4_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM5SQMTU].
32. Lisa M. Seghetti et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF:
BACKGROUND,
LEGISLATION,
AND
ISSUES
8
fig.3
(2007),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20070112_RL33259_ed02b2aa1c0e936bb1cad872e7532e9486a
d28f0.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBS5-US4N].
33. In the 2016 Term, the Supreme Court released fewer decisions than at any time since the
1860s, and the trend has been downward since the 1970s. See Alan Feldman, Looking Back to Make
Sense of the Court’s (Relatively) Light Workload, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (Jan. 9, 2018)
https://empiricalscotus.com/2018/01/09/light-workload [https://perma.cc/7WD9-P955].
34. See Menell & Vacca, supra note 1, at 868–69.
35. Id. at 873.
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that even intra-circuit disparity has increased as the ability or willingness of the
circuit courts to sit en banc has declined.36
One might argue that uniformity is more important in civil cases than in
criminal cases, because civil litigants are more likely to have multi-jurisdictional
interests that can benefit from interstate consistency and predictability.37 Further,
at least with respect to criminal procedure, Supreme Court pronouncements
about the Federal Constitution set the floor rather than the ceiling in the states,38
and thus variability among states on constitutional criminal law and procedure
issues is probably unavoidable to some extent. But those observations should not
obscure the countervailing consideration that the confusion and perceived
unfairness caused by disparity among circuits work particular mischief in the
criminal context, where the courts make momentous decisions regarding
deprivations of liberty and control of government power. Recent examples of
disarray in criminal doctrine created by the Court include highly consequential
rules governing when judges may depart from the sentencing guidelines,39 the
definition of violent crime for sentence enhancement purposes,40 and when a
warrant is needed to obtain information held by a third party.41
More importantly, the Supreme Court’s ability or willingness to resolve
these types of conflicts is dwindling. In the criminal procedure area, for instance,
the number of cases heard by the Court peaked in 1983 and averaged only
twenty-two a Term for the three decades after 1990, compared with roughly

36. Id. at 860 fig.22 (indicating a roughly 300 percent decrease in en banc merits determinations
since the 1970s).
37. Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis
are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved;
the opposite is true in cases . . . involving procedural and evidentiary rules.” (citations omitted)).
38. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (confirming the states’ ability to provide
more protection to criminal defendants under their own constitutions). State courts have been quite quick
to invoke this authority in criminal procedure cases. See Robert M. Howard et al., State Courts, the U.S.
Supreme Court, and the Protection of Civil Liberties, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 845 (2006) (examining
state court willingness to provide more protection to criminal defendants under state constitutions).
39. In 2009, Hessick and Hessick stated, “So long as the Court seeks to promote the two
conflicting Booker goals of discretion and uniformity in an ad hoc way, the law of appellate sentencing
review is likely to remain muddled and in a state of turmoil.” Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew
Hessick, Five Years of Appellate Problems After Booker, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 85, 88 (2009). That
assessment remains true today.
40. Caryn Devins, Lessons Learned from Retroactive Resentencing After Johnson and
Amendment 782, 10 FED. CTS. L. REV. 39, 107 (2018) (“In the wake of Johnson [v. United States],
significant circuit splits and legal uncertainty have arisen over the applicability of the remaining clauses
of the [Armed Career Criminal Act, which defines “violent felony” for sentencing purposes].”).
41. Because the Court only recently decided Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct.
2206 (2018), which appears to upend the Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine, it remains to be seen
whether, and how quickly, the Court will resolve the questions the case inevitably raises. See Susan
Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 205, 227–31 (2018) (projecting the possible impact of the Carpenter decision in the increasingly
complex telecommunications arena).
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thirty-seven criminal procedure cases a Term in the three decades before 1990.42
That reduction in caseload obviously reduces the ability to resolve conflicts in
such cases.43 In 2012, Wayne Logan, after identifying nearly three dozen
criminal law and procedure issues on which circuit courts explicitly disagreed,
concluded that “the Court regularly fails to reconcile the conflicts, ensuring that
the divergent outcomes endure and multiply with the passage of time.”44 In short,
the federal system is less likely now than it was fifty years ago to forge uniform,
nationally applicable law in criminal cases.45
D. Quality
Of the three metrics assessed here, the quality of judicial decision-making
over time is the hardest to gauge. But rough measures of quality at both the
district court and appellate levels are possible.
One measure of the quality of district court opinions is reversal rates. While
the rate at which circuit courts of appeals reverse district court decisions in
criminal cases has remained fairly steady since 2001 (between 4.9 and 7.6
percent), the overall trend has been in the upward direction.46 Also relevant to
the adequacy of trial level determinations is the fact that, compared to a quarter
century ago, full-time U.S. magistrate judges now handle a much wider array of
criminal dispositions, including felony guilty pleas, misdemeanor trials, pretrial

42. Analysis Specifications - Modern Data (1946-2018), WASH. UNIV. LAW, SUP. CT.
DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/analysis.php [https://perma.cc/H2DB-M5CF] (enter
“1960” through “2018” as the “Range of Terms” under the “TIME / ERA” parameter and check
“Criminal Procedure” as the “Issues” under the “CASE COMPONENTS” parameter).
43. See, e.g., ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, FED. JUD. CTR., UNRESOLVED INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS
67
(1991),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2015/Unresolved%20Intercircuit%20Conflicts%20Phase%20I
%20Hellman%201991.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS8T-NNQG] (finding that, of the cases involving
conflicts that were denied certiorari by the Supreme Court, one-third involved criminal issues). Many
criminal-related petitions are in forma pauperis, and Menell and Vacca suggest that in forma pauperis
petitions are not normally considered cert-worthy. Menell & Vacca, supra note 1, at 866 n.420. But
Hellman found that even within this category, eleven out of ninety-three, or approximately 10 percent,
of the petitions alleged conflicts that had been acknowledged by at least one court or other participant in
the system. HELLMAN, supra, at 53–54; see also Wendy L. Watson, The U.S. Supreme Court’s In Forma
Pauperis Docket: A Descriptive Analysis, 2 JUST. SYS. J. 47, 47 (2006) (finding that such petitions “are
not categorically frivolous and unimportant” and suggesting that they “require further consideration in
the literature on the Supreme Court’s agenda setting”).
44. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2012).
45. However, it should be noted that some have argued this state of affairs is desirable. See, e.g.,
Paul A. Holton, Comment, The “Do Nothing” Court: Why A Reduced Supreme Court Docket Is a Good
Thing, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 301 (2016) (arguing that because they apply facts to law more frequently
than the Supreme Court, circuit courts are better equipped to handle most cases).
46. See
Statistical
Tables
for
the
Federal
Judiciary,
U.S.
COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary
[https://perma.cc/N69Q-Q2X9] (showing in various tables that in the four years from 2001 to 2004, the
average reversal rate was 5.5 percent, whereas with the exception of 2006, 2010, and 2013, the reversal
rate has been over 6 percent every year since 2004 through 2019).
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matters, and habeas petitions.47 This substitution of magistrates for judges has
occasioned considerable controversy, largely because magistrates are not Article
III judges, but also because of concern that decision-making quality may suffer.48
At the appellate level, there is even greater cause for concern. William
Richman and William Reynolds point to evidence of what they assert are three
proxies for diminished judiciousness in the federal appellate courts: a significant
increase in unpublished and summary opinions (which may reduce judicial
accountability, given their limited distribution and precedential impact);49 a
smaller proportion of cases going to oral arguments (hypothesized to lead to less
careful trial preparation and reduced perceptions of legitimacy among the bar
and the public);50 and a significant expansion in the number and use of law clerks
and staff attorneys (who are not meant to be, and perhaps are not qualified to be,
surrogate decision-makers).51 Today over 85 percent of all circuit court of
appeals decisions are unpublished,52 about 75 percent of those decisions were
unaided by oral hearing,53 and staff attorneys (whose number is almost four times
what it was in the early 1980s54) are largely responsible both for determining
which cases are on this “Track Two” and for writing the initial opinions in those
cases.55 Richman and Reynolds argue that, in effect, these developments make
today’s federal intermediate appellate courts “certiorari courts.”56 The result is

47. See generally Douglas A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, “Nothing Less than Indispensable”: The
Expansion of Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utilization in the Past Quarter Century, 16 NEV.
L.J. 845 (2016) (examining the expansion of the role of magistrate judges over the preceding twentyfive years).
48. The controversy surfaced in Peretz v. United States, which in essence reversed Gomez v.
United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989), by holding that magistrates may, with the consent of the parties,
preside over felony jury selection. See 501 U.S. 923, 941 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“By
discarding Gomez’s categorical prohibition of magistrate felony jury selection, the majority
unnecessarily raises the troubling question whether this practice is consistent with Article III of the
Constitution. To compound its error, the majority resolves the constitutional question in a manner
entirely inconsistent with our controlling precedents.”); see also Kimberly Anne Huffman, Note, Peretz
v. United States: Magistrates Perform Felony Voir Dire, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1334, 1361 (1992) (“Peretz
thus marks the beginning of an expansion of magistrate authority, often at the expense of litigants’ rights
and constitutional protections, and without regard to whether consent to this authority is express or
implied.”).
49. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 42–55 (2012). The authors note, for instance, that Judge
Kozinski, “an outspoken supporter of limited publication,” has nonetheless stated that unpublished
opinions are “not safe for human consumption.” Id. at 44.
50. Id. at 85–90.
51. Id. at 97–114.
52. Id. at 38; see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES
COURTS:
TABLE
B-12,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T59G3EU] (showing that 88.2 percent of all circuit court opinions during the twelve-month period ending
September 30, 2018, were unpublished and that roughly 82 percent of these were unsigned).
53. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 49, at 92.
54. Id. at 112.
55. Id. at 164.
56. Id. at 118.
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the creation of two types of appellate cases, one that receives the “Learned Hand
treatment” (about 15 to 20 percent of the docket) and one that is handled with a
very truncated procedure.57
Most pertinent to the adequacy of decision-making in criminal cases,
Richman and Reynolds conclude that this second-tier treatment is most likely to
occur with a litigant “who is poor, without counsel, and with a boring, repetitive
problem,”58 and they specifically identify prisoners and criminal defendants as
paradigmatic of such litigants.59 Richman and Reynolds label this disparate
treatment an “injustice.”60 It is difficult to disagree with this conclusion.61
Another marker suggesting diminished judicial engagement is the federal
courts’ greater reliance over time on the harmless error doctrine, which allows
them to avoid reversing convictions by finding that, even had the alleged error
not occurred, sufficient evidence to convict remains.62 A survey of federal cases
since the 1960s indicates that judicial discussions of harmless error in criminal
cases increased over tenfold from the ten-year period leading up to 1975 to the
ten-year period leading up to 2019, an increase that amounts to more than three
times the pace of new federal criminal filings.63 This finding could be due to a
number of factors: the application of harmless error analysis to a larger range of

57. Id. at 163. The authors use the phrase “Learned Hand treatment” to describe opinions signed
by a judge after full briefing and oral arguments. Id. at 119–20.
58. Id. at 120.
59. Id.
60. Thus, their title, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 49.
61. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10, at 15, § 3.19 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1977) (stating that “thoughtful consideration of the merits by at least three judges” is a basic element of
an “appeal of right” and that overuse of appellate clerks and staff undermine this right); ROBERT L.
STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 17–18 (2d ed. 1989) (similarly arguing that
judges’ expanded reliance on staff “may have the effect of substituting the staff attorney for the judge
as the actual decider of the case”); Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A
Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Court of Appeals, 81
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 422, 436 (2013) (calling a two-track system “disquieting,” although also
noting second-track treatment may be justified for cases that involve repetitive problems, and
specifically mentioning sentencing appeals and bail appeals as examples). Certainly, today’s criminal
case resolution process is quite different from the process judges and legislators envisioned fifty years
ago. See Catherine T. Struve, The Federal Rules of Inmate Appeals, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247, 257 (2018)
(recounting judicial and congressional efforts in the 1960s to ensure “equal treatment of poor litigants,
especially in the criminal context”).
62. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23–34 (1967) (allowing courts finding
constitutional error to avoid reversal of a conviction if they find “beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained”).
63. See
Federal
Cases,
WESTLAW
EDGE,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/Cases/FederalCases (in search bar, enter “advanced: DA(aft
12-31-2009 & bef 01-02-2019) & “harmless error” & criminal”); id. (in search bar, enter “advanced:
DA(aft 12-31-1964 & bef 01-02-1975) & “harmless error” & criminal”). Note that, given these search
terms, the query may have picked up mostly “traditional” criminal cases (exclusive of habeas and
prisoner cases), which only increased by about 80 percent during the period considered, see supra text
accompanying notes 17–18, in comparison to the over 1,000 percent increase in harmless error cases,
see Federal Cases, supra.
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claims;64 a greater willingness of courts to find error; or stronger, more difficultto-overturn cases.65 But certainly a contributor is the fact that harmless error
doctrine is a convenient way to avoid costly retrials (and possible re-appeals).66
In sum, the federal court system appears to be falling short relative to its
performance fifty years ago, even when the focus is limited to criminal cases.
Efficiency, when measured in terms of the time it takes to process a case, appears
to have suffered appreciably at the trial level, undoubtedly due in part to the
increased caseload in the federal courts. Processing time at the appellate level
does not seem to have increased, but that achievement may have come at the cost
of a loss in consistency and quality of justice. Justice may not be significantly
delayed, and it may not be completely denied, but the litigants seeking it could
well be short-changed. On the assumption that this situation warrants some sort
of reform of the federal court system, the rest of this Article explores two
proposals that might simultaneously improve the efficiency, consistency, and
quality of decision-making in criminal cases: a federal court system devoted to
criminal cases, and a return to sentencing that relies on parole boards rather than
judges.
II.
A SEPARATE FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM
The idea of a separate federal criminal court at the trial and appellate levels
is not new. In 1996, Victor Williams proposed that the federal court system be
separated into civil and criminal divisions.67 Under Williams’s plan, the criminal
division would consist of U.S. District Criminal Courts, U.S. Courts of Criminal
Appeals (shadowing the current geographic distribution of circuit courts), and a
National Court of Criminal Appeals.68 This court system would be responsible

64. See Amy Knight Burns, Note, Counterfactual Contradictions: Interpretive Error in the
Analysis of AEDPA, 65 STAN. L. REV. 203, 215 (2013) (“[O]ver the last fifty years, the trend has been
to expand the class of cases in which harmless error analysis applies . . . .”).
65. One study of appeals to the federal circuits from 2011 through 2016 found that roughly 38
percent of alleged errors by the government and 8 percent of alleged errors by the defense were found
to be harmless in those cases with a “reasoned” opinion. Nancy J. King & Michael Heise, Appeals by
the Prosecution, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 482, 514 (2018). Presumably, the harmless error rate is
even higher in those cases that do not involve reasoned opinions.
66. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
4 (1994) (“[T]here is a widespread perception that in the Supreme Court, as well as in state and lower
federal courts, errors of some substance are nonetheless found harmless so as to permit the affirmance
of convictions.”); see also BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 200–01 (2011) (finding
that courts often relied on findings of harmless error in affirming convictions of defendants later found
to have been wrongly convicted).
67. Victor Williams, A Constitutional Charge and a Comparative Vision to Substantially
Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the Federal Judiciary: A Preliminary Blueprint for Remodeling
Our National Houses of Justice and Establishing a Separate System of Federal Criminal Courts, 37
WM. & MARY L. REV. 535 (1996).
68. Id. at 658.
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for hearing all criminal cases,69 criminal justice-related Bivens and § 1983
claims, and habeas claims involving federal issues.70 The National Court of
Criminal Appeals, composed of seven members, would have transfer jurisdiction
over cases certified from the U.S. Courts of Criminal Appeals as well as the
authority to grant certiorari review of cases decided by those courts.71 The U.S.
Supreme Court would have certiorari review of cases decided by the National
Court of Criminal Appeals,72 which is arguably a constitutional requirement,
given Article III’s stipulation that there be “one [S]upreme Court.”73 Judges in
the new system would come from the current district courts and circuit courts of
appeals, as well as from state courts and from the criminal prosecution and
defense bars.74 Williams claimed that such an organization would better “ensure
the speedy and fair adjudication of federal criminal cases” and “promote the
development of a motivated and experienced bench of expert criminal procedure
and criminal law jurists.”75
This organization of the court system would not only be new at the federal
level, but it would also be different from any current state court regime. Although
Oklahoma and Texas each have a criminal court of appeals that is the final arbiter
of criminal issues, and Alabama, New York, and Tennessee have a trial court or
appellate court division devoted entirely to criminal cases, no state has the type
of three-level criminal court proposed by Williams.76 Every other state court
mixes civil and criminal jurisdiction at both the trial and appellate levels (albeit
with some trial judges assigned solely to the criminal or civil docket).77

69. Some types of cases—such as those involving special commitment of sex offenders, see
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010)—are quasi-criminal in nature, and others—such as
securities cases—could trigger criminal, administrative, or civil sanctions, or all three. While the civil
judiciary could conceivably have jurisdiction over these types of cases, the better, and easier,
determinant of whether they end up on the criminal side of the federal docket should be whether the
action is initiated by the criminal division of the Department of Justice. In other words, the executive
branch would decide where the case would be heard.
70. Williams, supra note 67, at 658.
71. Id. at 668.
72. Id. at 668–69.
73. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1. This feature would also help avoid competing rulings on issues
that affect both civil and criminal cases, such as rules regarding expert testimony, a problem said to
afflict the Texas system, whose Court of Criminal Appeals is the ultimate arbiter of criminal law issues.
See Ben L. Mesches, Bifurcated Appellate Review: The Texas Story of Two High Courts, A.B.A. (Nov.
1,
2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal/2014/fall/bifurcated_appella
te_review_the_texas_story_of_two_high_courts [https://perma.cc/9NHL-NMEA] (commenting on the
development of Texas’s bifurcated appellate system and the broad authority of its Court of Criminal
Appeals).
74. Williams, supra note 67, at 666.
75. Id. at 658.
76. For a survey of the court structure of all fifty states, see State Court Structure Charts, NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CT. STAT. PROJECT (2018), http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/State_Court_Structure_Charts.aspx [https://perma.cc/5C2H-VE3F].
77. See id.
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In contrast, in several European countries, designated criminal courts are
common. In France, for instance, criminal cases are heard in tribunaux devoted
entirely to criminal cases and are appealed to criminal appeals courts.78 In
Germany, trial courts hear both criminal and civil cases, but specialized criminal
courts hear appeals of criminal cases in each of Germany’s judicial divisions.79
Ideally, some empirical method of figuring out whether any of these
specialized criminal courts are more efficient, consistent, and capable than their
generalist counterparts could be devised. But no such studies have been done.80
The number of variables that would need to be held constant to obtain
meaningful results, and the difficulties of defining what those variables should
be, are daunting. The following discussion is admittedly somewhat speculative
on all three fronts.
A. Advantages
Presumably, a specialized criminal court system would be more expedient
than the current generalist system, an advantage that could have particularly
significant payoff at the trial level, where processing times have exploded.
Judges in such a system would be more familiar with the rules and doctrine
governing criminal cases, which in some respects diverge significantly from
analogous civil law.81 Of course, in a generalist system, a judge with no prior
experience in criminal cases will over time acclimate to the environment, aided
by memoranda and briefs from the parties. But judges in the proposed system
will handle two to three times the number of trials, habeas hearings, guilty pleas,
and sentencings that judges currently handle,82 which means that the necessary

78. See, e.g., Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an
American Perspective, 12 B.U. INT’L L.J. 57, 60–61 (1994) (“There are 455 tribunaux d’instance and
175 tribunaux de grande instance in France. Whereas the tribunaux d’instance are presided by a single
magistrate, cases before the tribunaux de grande instance are heard by three judges. Each of the two
courts contain both a civil and a criminal chamber.” (footnotes omitted))
79. Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German Design from an
American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 44 (1981) (noting that each appellate
court has civil and criminal divisions).
80. But see infra note 91 (comparing appellate decision-making in the four states with
specialized criminal courts to appellate decision-making in other states).
81. Examples of significant divergence include discovery rules, settlement and plea bargaining
conferences, and the jury selection process, as well as the byzantine rules governing habeas corpus
review, which do not have any close analogy on the civil side. See generally Ion Meyn, Why Civil and
Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten History, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 734 (2017)
(analyzing the different paths that reform of the civil and criminal procedure rules took and concluding
that “the reform of criminal procedure integrated civil rules that increased efficiency, like notice pleading
and liberalized joinder, but rejected countermeasures designed to ensure accuracy, like judicial
intervention and discovery tools”).
82. This assumes that criminal cases constitute about 40 percent of the average judge’s docket
in today’s generalist system. See supra note 26.
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experience and wisdom will come more quickly and that lessons learned will not
need to be relearned because of intervening civil matters.83
The proposal’s effect on the efficiency of civil cases is also important.
Because of the Speedy Trial Act and local rules, criminal cases have priority at
the trial level of the federal court system.84 Many commentators have noted that
the criminal docket is a dominant, or perhaps even the primary, reason for delays
in civil cases.85 With criminal cases removed, that backlog would abate.
A specialized criminal court would also promote doctrinal consistency.
Compared to the current system, which relies on the whims of the U.S. Supreme
Court, a National Court of Criminal Appeals would vastly increase the capacity
to resolve conflicts within the lower courts. Even if the National Court mimicked
the same reluctance to decide cases currently evidenced by the Supreme Court,
it would be resolving more than three times as many criminal cases as the Court
currently does, since such cases comprise roughly one-third of the Supreme
Court’s docket.86 That additional capacity would also probably substantially
reduce the need for the en banc process, which the circuits have introduced in an
effort to reduce disparity, but which has been cumbersome and problematic in
many other ways.87 And on the off chance that Congress decided to fund
additional judgeships and the influx of new arbiters caused, as some have

83. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 49, at 198 (“Specialized judges . . . work more
efficiently and quickly because they do not need to learn the elementary principles of an unfamiliar
subject for each new case on the docket.”).
84. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2018); e.g., Zukowski v. Howard, Needles, Tammen, and
Bergendoff, 115 F.R.D. 53, 55 (D. Colo. 1987) (“The principle of criminal case preference was . . . made
a practical necessity by the enactment of the Speedy Trial Act. While some minor adjustments can be
made, there is no longer any doubt criminal cases must take precedence over civil cases on a federal
court’s docket.” (citation omitted)).
85. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 906 (1993) (reporting a survey of 194 members of
district court advisory groups established by the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, where one respondent
named “the delay in appointing judges and the priority given the criminal justice system under the
Speedy Trial Act” as the two “fundamental causes of undue expense and delay” on the civil side (citation
omitted)); Diana E. Murphy, The Concerns of Federal Judges, 74 JUDICATURE 112, 114 (1990) (arguing
that “no management system for civil litigation in federal trial courts can be effective without adequate
numbers of judges, relief from crushing criminal caseloads, and reduction in time-consuming
processes”).
86. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1233 fig.3 (2012).
87. Some of the questions that arise concern how big the en banc panel should be, the manner
in which en banc review is triggered, and the precedential impact of en banc decisions. See SAMUEL
ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 133 (1986) (noting that appeals courts so rarely grant petitions for
rehearing en banc that “this avenue of redress is for all practical purposes nonexistent”). Claims have
also been made that the en banc process is heavily tainted by ideology. See Note, The Politics of En
Banc Review, 102 HARV. L. REV. 864 (1989).
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surmised,88 increased decisional inconsistency, that problem could more easily
be addressed.89
For similar reasons, a federal criminal court would probably improve the
quality of decisions in cases involving criminal litigation, at both the trial and
appellate levels. At the trial level, judges who preside over only criminal
adjudications cannot help but be more adept at handling pretrial and evidentiary
rulings, making decisions about instructions, and understanding the nuances of
sentencing. Reliance on magistrates could also be substantially reduced.
At the appellate level, a specialized criminal court system would minimize
the likelihood of poorly reasoned opinions from novices to the field, and
maximize the probability of persuasive precedent written by judges who are
confident of their grasp of the subject.90 More concretely, a National Court of
Criminal Appeals and specialized intermediate appellate courts would
significantly enhance judicial capacity to hear criminal appeals, habeas claims,
and prisoner rights cases without resorting to unpublished opinions.91 It would
also reduce reliance on staff attorneys as surrogate decision-makers who, in any
event, would presumably be better at their job because of their concentration on
criminal cases.92
Some have argued against a fourth level of court like the proposed National
Court of Criminal Appeals on the ground that it would create an additional layer
of review that litigants must negotiate and a new body of caselaw that they must
master.93 But the same certiorari papers aimed at obtaining a hearing at the

88. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 49, at 183–204 (explaining why this argument is a
“great red herring,” as there is “no evidence that increasing the number of judgeships within a circuit
reduces the stability of circuit law or increases the rate of appeal”).
89. Consistency would be further enhanced by amending § 2254(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, which currently provides that state courts need only follow opinions of the
U.S. Supreme Court, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), to require states to follow opinions of
the National Court of Criminal Appeals as well (unless, of course, the opinion is overruled by the U.S.
Supreme Court).
90. Cf. Paul D. Carrington, The Obsolescence of the United States Courts of Appeals: Roscoe
Pound’s Structural Solution, 15 J.L. & POL. 515, 518–20 (1999) (noting that circuit court opinions often
have little precedential effect because other panels do not respect the expertise of previous “small,
randomly selected” panels).
91. A comparison of the four states with specialized criminal appellate courts indicates that all
four are more likely to give defendants a merits review, and three of the four (excepting Oklahoma) are
more likely to issue full judicial opinions than the average across the other states. Compare Michael
Heise et al., State Criminal Appeals Revealed, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1939, 1953 tbl.3 (2017) (showing that,
on average, 55.5 percent of cases on appeal received merits review and 34.6 percent led to a full judicial
opinion), with E-mail from Michael Heise to author (May 18, 2019) (on file with author) (showing the
analogous data on Texas to be 60.1 and 40.7 percent; on Oklahoma to be 90 and 10 percent; on Alabama
to be 61.9 and 42.9 percent; and on Tennessee to be 58.8 and 58.8 percent). However, oral arguments
were rare or non-existent in all four states. E-mail from Michael Heise to author, supra.
92. See Levy, supra note 61, at 443 (arguing that since the success of “nonargument review” of
repeating claims “depends in large part on the staff attorneys who assess them . . . , circuit courts would
do well to structure staff attorney offices to encourage subject-specific expertise where possible”).
93. See Menell & Vacca, supra note 1, at 830–31 (describing these and other criticisms of the
proposal for an Inter-Circuit Tribunal).
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National Court of Criminal Appeals could, if relief is denied by that court, be
used to petition the Supreme Court. Moreover, the increased resolution of
conflicts that the new court would occasion should reduce the welter of caselaw
that currently confronts those trying to ascertain the merits of their case. At the
same time, the existence of the National Court would lighten the Supreme
Court’s burden, which could then devote more attention to truly significant cases.
Finally, it is worth noting that a federal court system of this sort, specifically
designed to handle criminal cases, would track practice in every other area of the
law. Lawyers increasingly tend to specialize, especially in the criminal arena,
where public defenders are generally considered to be more qualified than
private attorneys who represent indigent clients.94 State court systems are also
moving toward more specialization in the criminal domain.95 At the federal court
level, Edward Cheng’s research suggests that circuit courts already recognize the
value of having judges concentrate on particular areas by relying on an informal
opinion-assignment process that tends to favor certain judges with certain types
of cases.96 The advantage of the proposed system would be that all panelists
would be experts, so that no one judge could dominate, or routinely be assigned
to write, the “criminal” opinions.97
For the likely readers of this Article, however, perhaps the most persuasive
argument for a specialized court pertains to the legal academy: no professor of
criminal law or procedure would even consider teaching every subject in the
curriculum. Yet we ask federal judges to perform an analogous function.
Specialization is key to mastering any subject.
B. Criticisms
The advantages of a federal criminal court system are sizeable. But
criticisms of such a regime have also been numerous, perhaps best summarized
by Judge Diane Wood. While acknowledging that “[j]udges in most other
countries are often staggered by the breadth of the American federal judge’s
writ,”98 Judge Wood still enthusiastically supported the current system, claiming
that generalist judges bring advantages that specialists do not. As she put it:

94. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Remark, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676, 2681–82
(2013) (“Many studies have been done in capital cases and they are remarkably consistent in
documenting that . . . those with government-paid attorneys are much better off with public defenders
than with appointed counsel.”).
95. Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal
Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1590 (2012) (stating that there are approximately three thousand specialized
criminal courts in the U.S. and its territories, including drug courts, mental health courts, veterans courts,
and reentry courts).
96. See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526 (2008).
97. See id. at 560 (arguing that “[i]f judges without a criminal law background avoid writing
criminal opinions” and “former criminal defense attorneys seldom become judges because of political
unpopularity,” then former prosecutors are left to determine the future of federal criminal law).
98. Diane P. Wood, Speech, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755,
1756 (1997).
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Generalist judges cannot become technocrats; they cannot hide behind
specialized vocabulary and “insider” concerns. The need to explain even
the most complex area to the generalist judge (and often to a jury as
well) forces the bar to demystify legal doctrine and to make the law
comprehensible.99
Judge Wood also argued that a generalist docket encourages the crossfertilization of ideas and ensures a fresh look at entrenched procedures by judges
who have not been co-opted by the system.100
Related to this last point is the fear of capture—the idea that, given the
increasingly political nature of the selection process, judgeships will be
populated by individuals who adhere to the values of groups the courts are
supposed to monitor.101 This could be a particular problem in criminal cases.
Even in our current generalist regime, 43 percent of judges are ex-prosecutors,
which is four times higher than the proportion of judges who are ex-public
defenders.102 The possibility that this fraction would increase in a specialized
court raises the specter of a system even more draconian than the current one.
A third general worry about specialization, especially at the circuit court
level, is that a steady diet of similar cases in a court now perceived to be
“secondary” will lead to judicial boredom and loss of judicial prestige. Perhaps
neither concern is significant in itself. But some have posited that these
consequences are not only likely, but will also lead to lower-quality opinions and
dissuasion of the most qualified applicants.103
While these objections might have force with respect to some types of
specialized courts, they are weak in the criminal context. Criminal law is
decidedly less technocratic than expert-infested areas such as antitrust, the
primary example Judge Wood gives of legalese.104 Nor is its content mundane
or narrow; it raises a host of important constitutional issues, ranging from the
scope of the Fourth Amendment to the definition of cruel and unusual
punishment, as well as challenging non-constitutional issues involving
interpretations of criminal statutes and common law doctrines. When habeas and
class action suits brought by prisoners and detainees are added to the mix, civil
as well as criminal procedure rules would be in play.105 The likelihood of capture
99. Id. at 1767.
100. Id.; PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 168 (1976) (arguing that specialized
judges “will lose sight of the basic values at stake” and develop “arcane [law] understood only by their
own bar”).
101. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989).
102. RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS 200 (2019) (providing the ex-prosecutor
percentage and indicating that the percentage of judges who were previously public defenders is 10.4
percent).
103. See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 100, at 168.
104. Wood, supra note 98, at 1767.
105. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018) (providing a mix of criminal and civil rules for habeas
actions); Graves v. Penzone, No. CV-77-00479-PHX-NVW, 2017 WL 782991 (D. Ariz. Mar. 1, 2017)
(class action challenging confinement conditions of pretrial detainees in Maricopa County, Arizona).
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is also minimal; indeed, capture might actually be reduced in a specialized
system because, in contrast to the current situation, the defense bar will know
which judicial positions will focus on the criminal docket and can concentrate
their lobbying power there.106 In any event, the assumption that ex-prosecutors
will generally be anti-defendant is false (consider Justice Sonia Sotomayor, for
example).107 And unlike the civil arena, where high-paying law firm jobs beckon,
there are literally thousands of well-qualified—but not well-compensated—
prosecutors and defense attorneys who would find both the work and the pay
associated with a federal judgeship highly attractive.
If, however, concerns about capture, tunnel vision, boredom, and the like
persist, they could be alleviated by a rotation system of the type routinely
practiced in many states.108 Judges who migrate from civil to criminal court and
back again will have both expertise and diverse experiences. At the same time,
to ensure the necessary expertise develops, the rotation should be for a fairly long
period of time, perhaps two to three years.109
Of course, if the proposed federal criminal court system were seriously
understaffed, no amount of experience or expertise could compensate. But as
suggested in Part I and confirmed by Menell and Vacca’s data,110 assuming
current criminal and civil caseloads, a federal criminal court system needs only
about two-thirds the number of judges that the civil docket requires.111 This ratio
also means that not every civil-side judge would need to rotate through the
106. It is also belied by past experience in Texas, where the Court of Criminal Appeals has
disagreed with prosecution-oriented decisions by the Fifth Circuit on several occasions. Gary A.
Udashen & Barry Sorrels, Criminal Procedure: Confession, Search and Seizure, 45 SW. L.J. 263, 269–
73 (1991); see also Michael J. McCormick et al., Fundamental Defect in Appellate Review of Error in
the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 827, 827 (1984) (noting the Texas court’s “[c]ontinued
expansion” of the automatic reversal standard of review for fundamental error).
107. Perhaps of relevance here is the fact that during the relatively “liberal” Obama
administration, 42 percent of district court judges and 37.5 percent of circuit court judges nominated to
the federal bench were ex-prosecutors. ALL. FOR JUSTICE, BROADENING THE BENCH: PROFESSIONAL
DIVERSITY
AND
JUDICIAL
NOMINATIONS
8–9
(2016),
https://www.afj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Professional-Diversity-Report.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20191118050834/https://www.afj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Professional-Diversity-Report.pdf].
108. In Denver, for instance, “[a]bout one-third of the Judges change assignments annually[,]
with the usual rotation being eighteen months in domestic relations, two years in criminal, and three
years in civil.” DENVER DIST. COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT: DISTRICT AND JUVENILE COURT
OVERVIEW
2020,
at
1,
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Judicial_Nominating_C
ommissions/Overviews/02_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/6B2Z-8GZA].
109. See COMM. ON THE SUPERIOR COURT CIRCUIT SYS., BOS. BAR ASS’N, ROTATION RIPE FOR
REFORM
7–8, 9–11 (2003),
https://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/bbatask122203.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SBF6-NG87] (noting that New Jersey, Florida, and Rhode Island courts rotate every
two to three years, and criticizing the short-term rotation of judges within the Massachusetts Superior
Court Circuit System, measured in months).
110. Menell & Vacca, supra note 1, at 844 fig.2. Recall that “civil cases” include prisoner and
habeas cases, and so should be reduced accordingly.
111. See supra note 26 (noting that, in the typical year, the number of criminal cases filed is about
two-thirds the number of civil cases filed).
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criminal system, and criminal-side judges could always be assured of a job on
the civil side when their rotations end.
III.
SENTENCING BY PAROLE BOARD
If the goal is to ensure judicial capacity and expertise adequate to handle
criminal cases in the federal court system, a second reform—one that could be
integrated into either the proposed federal criminal justice system or the current
system—should target sentencing practices. Today’s federal courts labor under
the much-maligned federal sentencing guidelines, which were driven by a desire
to ensure uniformity in sentencing and, to a lesser extent, a desire to implement
a just deserts philosophy.112 In other work, I have proposed a quite different
approach to sentencing which, although not originally conceived as a palliative
to the problems addressed here, could have the effect of reducing judicial
workload at both the appellate and the trial court level.113
In brief, the proposal is to rejuvenate and modernize the indeterminate
sentencing regime that once existed throughout the country. Indeterminate
sentencing was abolished in the federal system in 1984114 and has been
abandoned in a number of states as well, replaced by sentencing frameworks that
rely on narrow dispositional ranges determined primarily by an offender’s
perceived desert or blameworthiness.115 In revised form, however, indeterminate
sentencing is worth reconsidering for a number of reasons.
In the regime that I have proposed, legislatures or sentencing commissions
would set relatively broad dispositional ranges based on desert concerns, but
ultimate decisions about sentence length would be left to a parole board.116 For
instance, the legislature might provide that a person convicted of armed robbery
should receive a sentence of one to ten years, a range that the judge would impose
upon conviction. But the date of release within that range would depend on a
parole board’s evaluation of the offender’s risk of reoffending and various other
factors, and might vary significantly for people convicted of the same offense.
112. See generally Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing,
74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 749, 779 (2006) (stating that “[u]niformity has become a dominant objective of
the federal sentencing system” and noting that the federal Sentencing Commission “characterized the
guidelines as an effort to ‘balance’ certainty with proportionality” (citation omitted)).
113. See Christopher Slobogin, Limiting Retributivism and Individual Prevention, in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE OF PUNISHMENT (Farah Focquaert et al.
eds., forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Slobogin, Limiting Retributivism and Prevention] (on file with
author); Christopher Slobogin, Plea Bargaining and the Substantive and Procedural Goals of Criminal
Justice: From Retribution and Adversarialism to Preventive Justice and Hybrid-Inquisitorialism, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505 (2016).
114. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat.
1837, 2027.
115. See Edward E. Rhine, The Present Status and Future Prospects of Parole Boards and
Parole Supervision, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 627, 631–32
(Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., photo. rprt. 2015) (2012).
116. See Slobogin, Limiting Retributivism and Prevention, supra note 113 (manuscript §§ 2–4).
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While previous manifestations of parole boards, often staffed by political
appointees, have been rightly criticized for their uninformed decision-making
and unwillingness to take chances on releasing prisoners early,117 these concerns
can be addressed by ensuring that parole boards are composed of professionals
who make use of modern risk assessment and risk management techniques and
are guided by pre-set criteria.118
The original goal motivating this proposal was to reduce our egregious
mass incarceration problem by improving the ability to identify low-risk
offenders who do not need to be confined for long periods, increasing
alternatives to prison that are better at minimizing recidivism, and reducing
prosecutorial power over dispositions.119 However, another beneficial byproduct of the proposed system is that it would significantly decrease the number
of appeals to the circuit courts. Since the advent of the federal sentencing
guidelines, appeals have made up a large portion of the federal criminal appellate
docket.120 If, instead, parole boards were in charge of sentencing, trial court
dispositions would be the subject of challenge much less frequently.121
This reform could also benefit trial judges. Because sentencing decisions
involve deprivations of liberty, they are arguably the most consequential
determinations a trial judge makes. More than one judge has expressed dread
about making such decisions.122 If judges heard only criminal cases, as proposed
in this Article, they might become even more inured to familiar-sounding
117. See Rhine, supra note 115, at 630–31; see also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40, 56–58, as
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3223, 3239–41 (detailing reasons for abolishing parole in the
federal system).
118. See Slobogin, Limiting Retributivism and Prevention, supra note 113 (manuscript § 3). For
a more detailed description of professionalized parole boards, see Edward E. Rhine et al., The Future of
Parole Release, 46 CRIME & JUST. 279 (2017).
119. Slobogin, Limiting Retributivism and Prevention, supra note 113 (manuscript § 1) (“[A]
system of relatively wide sentence ranges derived from retributive principles, in combination with short
minimum sentences that are enhanced under limited circumstances by statistically-driven risk
assessment and management, can alleviate many of the inherent tensions between desert and prevention,
between deontology and political reality, and between the desire for community input and the allure of
expertise. If done properly, it should also significantly reduce prison populations.”).
120. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of
Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1491 (1997) (“Of 6659 criminal appellate
decisions of all kinds in 1994-95 . . . 4314 of these, or 65%, dealt with an appeal from sentence.”). But
see King & O’Neill, supra note 23, at 227 (finding that appeal waivers have reduced sentencing appeals
since Reitz wrote).
121. Cf. Reitz, supra note 120, at 1443 (“Prior to the guideline innovations of the 1980s, little
meaningful appellate review of sentencing decisions had ever occurred in the United States, in federal
or state courts.”). Under the proposed regime, however, appeals to the courts would still be necessary to
develop a much-needed jurisprudence of risk assessment. Slobogin, Limiting Retributivism and
Prevention, supra note 113 (manuscript §§ 5–6).
122. Consider these remarks by a Second Circuit judge, formerly a U.S. District Court judge:
“Sentencing is perhaps the most important responsibility of a trial judge, and surely the most difficult.
Emotion is one reason it is so difficult. The competing considerations evoke strong sentiments—anger,
indignation, shame, sorrow, grief, despondency, and hope. The sentencing judge is not immune from
these emotions.” Denny Chin, Essay, Sentencing: A Role for Empathy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1579
(2012) (footnote omitted).
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excuses and pleas for leniency or more enervated by the psychological demands
of doing justice.123 However, that would be true only if the federal courts
continued to abide by the federal sentencing guidelines which, especially in their
current “voluntary” form, leave complex and highly charged decisions about
retribution, deterrence, and prevention to the judge.124
Under the system I propose, the judge would have a much-diminished role
at sentencing. The nature of the offense, not the judge, would automatically place
the defendant in one of five or so ranges for felonies (for example, from one to
twenty years, one to ten years, one to five years, one to three years, and one to
two years).125 The specific length of sentence would depend, as it once did in
virtually every jurisdiction,126 on the parole board’s assessment of the offender’s
progress in rehabilitative programs and similar considerations. Because the
sentencing decision in a parole-driven regime involves simply matching the
crime of conviction with the legislatively authorized range, it would not burden
the judge with difficult and psychologically taxing decisions about how much
punishment is “deserved,” how “dangerous” the offender is, and how long a
sentence is needed to ensure “deterrence.”
CONCLUSION
A separate federal criminal judiciary, together with a modernized
indeterminate sentencing regime, could be the beginning of a formula for
streamlining the criminal justice process, ensuring high-quality and more
consistent judicial decision-making, and reducing our reliance on prison. These
are not the only promising criminal justice reforms, of course; limiting federal
criminal jurisdiction, de-criminalization, and shortening sentences across the
board would have similar benefits. But the reforms proposed here have received
much less attention.
Are the changes proposed in this Article politically feasible? As Menell and
Vacca demonstrate, many federal judges are dead-set against a substantial
increase in judgeships, dividing up the federal court system into specialty courts,
123. In researching this Article, I corresponded with two court of appeals judges, two district
court judges, and a state court judge, all of whom expressed this view.
124. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50, 50 n.6 (2007) (explaining that, after
calculating the appropriate guidelines range, the sentencing judge “should then consider all of the
§ 3553(a) factors [which include ‘seriousness of the offense,’ ‘deterrence,’ ‘protect[ion of] the public,’
and education and correction treatment] to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a
party” and noting that “[i]n so doing, [the judge] may not presume that the Guidelines range is
reasonable”).
125. These ranges are taken from the original Model Penal Code, which endorsed indeterminate
sentences. MODEL PENAL CODE Alternative § 6.06 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
126. Kevin R. Reitz, The “Traditional” Indeterminate Sentencing Model, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 270, 277 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., photo.
rprt. 2015) (2012) (“For its policy foundation, the parole release system since late in the nineteenth
century has most often been linked with rehabilitation theory. . . . The key function of the paroling
authority is to review each prisoner’s progress, and to use its expertise to identify those who have reached
the goal.” (citations omitted)).
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or any other type of radical change, and Congress has heeded their resistance.127
And the dominant sentencing philosophy in both Congress and the Sentencing
Commission could continue to be retribution,128 a stance that is antithetical to
indeterminate sentencing (which is mostly focused on specific deterrence and
rehabilitation).129 In particular, parole boards may still be anathema to most
policy-makers.130
At the same time, the federal court system has not been entirely hostile to
specialization in criminal-related areas. In the past decade, the federal system has
experimented with reentry courts, drug courts, and other problem-solving courts
(with over sixty-five established as of 2015).131 The motivation for creating these
types of courts is also more consistent with the individual prevention and
treatment goals of indeterminate sentencing than with retribution.132 On both
sides of the aisle, there is significant momentum against the harshness of our
criminal justice system and the over-use of imprisonment, an attitude
demonstrated by the recently passed First Step Act,133 which bets heavily on risk

127. See Menell & Vacca, supra note 1, at 841, 843 (noting, for example, that in the 2000s, “the
major governance organizations for the federal judiciary largely shuttered the reform studies and
initiatives” and that “[a]fter three decades of concerted efforts toward the end of the last millennium to
adapt the federal judiciary to substantial change, the reform machinery ground to a halt as the new
millennium began”); see also RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 49, at 217–22 (discounting the federal
judiciary’s arguments that creating more than one thousand judgeships would dilute quality and prestige,
and attributing appellate judges’ resistance to reform to their comfort with their current quasiadministrative role, given its similarity to senior partnership in a large law firm, to their “distaste” for
run-of-the-mill cases, and to elitism).
128. See, e.g., Jane L. Froyd, Comment, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1488 (2000) (stating that “[t]his goal of
retribution or ‘just desserts’ [sic] was the most commonly voiced reason for instituting mandatory
minimum penalties” on drug offenders); James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 180 (2010)
(discussing “the prioritization of retribution” under the Guidelines).
129. See supra text accompanying note 125.
130. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 126–33 (Univ. of Ill. Press 1976)
(1969) (ultimately calling the federal parole board the most disappointing agency the author had ever
encountered).
131. See Drug Courts, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/drugcourts/Pages/welcome.aspx
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190811033756/https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/drugcourts/Pages/welcome.aspx] (indicating that there are twenty-seven federal district drug courts);
Specialized Courts, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/pages/specializedcourts.aspx
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190820231911/https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/pages/specializedcourts.aspx] (indicating that there are forty-four federal reentry courts and two federal “problem solving”
courts).
132. See Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts and Pragmatism, 73 MD. L. REV. 1120,
1127, 1129 (2014) (stating that “[t]he driving force behind the problem-solving courts movement from
its inception has been an express commitment to efficacy,” a movement that “offers ‘therapeutic
outcomes’ for participants, rather than ‘legal resolutions’ for cases”).
133. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
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assessment and management tools in determining who should be imprisoned, for
how long, and under what programs.134
These trends point in the right direction. If they don’t inspire the types of
changes proposed in this Article in the near future, perhaps they will by 2030,
when the reforms proffered at this Symposium are meant to go into effect.
Without major structural change in the federal court system of some sort now or
in the near future, criminal defendants will continue to pay the price for
overworked courts and overflowing prisons.

134. Brandon L. Garrett, The Prison Reform Bill’s Implementation Will Be Tricky, SLATE (Dec.
27,
2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/12/prison-reform-bill-success.html
[https://perma.cc/8RUW-R3QY] (“The final version of the First Step Act, which refers to ‘risk’ 100
times, calls for a ‘risk and needs assessment system’ to be developed in 210 days, and then made public
and administered to every federal prison within the following 180 days.”).

